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Europe as a demoi-cratic polity 
 
PROFESSOR SAMANTHA BESSON1  
Summary: The question of democratic legitimacy in Europe has resurfaced with a particular gravity 
after the French and Dutch rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005. By 
concentrating on the supranational or international level of governance in the EU, accounts of European 
democracy propounded since the early 1990s have diverted attention away from the national level. Since 
the latter remains the primary locus not only of national law-making, but also of European legal enfor-
cement, however, it is important not to underestimate its importance in the European legitimation 
process. Of course, reverting entirely to traditional statist conceptions of democracy would be vain and 
theoretical models need to adapt to the post-national legal reality in Europe. The legitimacy gap in the 
European Union will not be filled before European constitutional pluralism is matched by a correspond-
ing model of democratic legitimacy. The paper identifies three dimensions of a model of European de-
mocracy that is sensitive to the new post-national institutional reality in Europe: first, democracy should 
be understood as pluralistic both in the quantity of democratic subjects participating in European de-
mocracy and in the quality of their individual constituency; second, and this is a consequence of its 
pluralism, European democracy should not only be denationalized, but also deterritorialized so as to 
include all those affected in each and every single one of the many democratic subjects identified; finally, 
European democracy should be deliberative so as to be as flexible and dynamic as possible and match its 
inherent plurality and deterritorialization.   
Keywords: European Union, political legitimacy, democracy, constitutional pluralism, deterritorializa-
tion. 
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Our European demoi-cracy is neither simply a Uni-
on of democracies nor a Union as democracy. Our Euro-
pean demoi-cracy is instead one of the most innova-
tive political machines ever invented to create and 
manage not only economic but also democratic in-
terdependence. [...] Our European demoi-cracy is 
predicated on the mutual recognition, confrontation 
and ever more demanding sharing of our respective 
and separate identities – not on their merger. The 
EU is a community of others. In political terms, a 
demoi-cracy is not predicated on a common identi-
ty, European public space and political life. Instead, 
it requires informed curiosity about the political li-
ves of our neighbours and mechanisms for our voi-
ces to be heard in each other’s forums. In time, a 
multinational politics should emerge from the con-
frontation, mutual accommodation and mutual 
inclusion of our respective political cultures. 
(Nicolaïdis, 2003, 5) 
Introduction 
A polity is a political entity; it can be a state, but it need not be a state. The question 
whether the European Union (EU) may be regarded as a political entity, albeit a sui generis 
and complex one, equates to the question of its legitimacy. In turn, this legitimacy is 
usually taken to be democratic par excellence: there can be no politeia without polites, i.e. no 
polity without citizens and hence no polity without democracy.  
 True, there are many other dimensions to legitimacy than procedural legitimacy and to 
procedural legitimacy than democracy (see von Bogdandy 2004). However, recent deve-
lopments in the European constitutional debate have shown that democracy is one of the 
most resilient and difficult questions pertaining to the legitimacy of the European project. 
Somehow, issues raised in the past few years with respect to the legitimacy of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, and of European constitutionalism more generally, 
always seemed to boil down to the existence or non-existence of a European demos able to 
constitute itself. In other words, one of the ways to broach the European constitutional 
question and openly face its current crisis might be to re-assess the fundamental question 
of democracy in Europe. 
 In fact, the recent constitutional turmoil has also revealed another important fact about 
the European polity and that is that the democratic legitimacy of the European Union is 
not all that matters. True, the EU suffers from a democratic deficit at the international 
and supranational level, but it would be wrong to want to remedy that deficit as one 
would at the national level by conceiving of the European polity as a state-like albeit 
supranational entity. Democracy in the complex European polity cannot be understood 
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properly without its national dimension. Recent discussions pertaining to the legitimacy of 
the European Constitutional Treaty have too often been uprooted from the soil of national 
constitutions and democracies, and the Treaty paid a high price for this in national refe-
renda. While an important part of law-making processes takes place beyond the national 
state, the latter remains the central locus of transposition and implementation of European 
law and hence of its legitimation. After all, the European legal order is an integrated legal 
order in which European law is made an integral part of national law.2 
 Yet, reverting, as many suggest, to national democracy in national matters and to the 
distinct national demoi in abstracting from their common Europeanness would be throwing 
out the baby with the bath water. In a globalized Europe, democratic processes can no 
longer take place at different levels without regard to each other; legal pluralism implies 
indeed that many legal norms of different origins apply in each and every Member State 
without necessarily having been adopted in neatly territorialized democratic processes in 
which those to whom they apply have had a chance to take part. In other words, the legal 
and constitutional pluralism that has been observed and thematized in European legal 
scholarship (see e.g. Walker 2002) for quite some time now needs to be matched by a 
pluralism in legitimacy mechanisms in each and every single law-making process. This 
implies, I will argue, that the European polity should be conceived not so much as a de-
mocracy made of one single demos, whether as the international sum of many separate na-
tional demoi connected at the governmental level or as a supranational demos constituted in 
European parliamentary institutions, but as a demoi-cracy, i.e. a democracy of many Euro-
pean demoi connected vertically at many different levels, but also horizontally at the natio-
nal level.  
 However, just as constitutional pluralism cannot be identified with constitutional anar-
chy and has given rise to all sorts of coherence mechanisms, understanding the pluralism 
in European sources of legitimacy implies, first, identifying the many democratic processes 
at work in Europe and, second, accounting for their coordination mechanisms in practice. 
Although the theorizing of European democracy has been at work for quite some time 
now, most publicized accounts fall short of an institutional proposal, i.e. of an account of 
how to turn their normative proposal into a complete institutional setting. Some of them 
do not even provide a normative proposal that takes into account current European insti-
tutional circumstances. And this shortcoming is one of the reasons for their failure to con-
vince as they deserve to (Buchanan 2004).  
 In order to theorize an institution-sensitive model of European demoi-cracy, one needs, 
first, to unpack and understand one of Europe’s best-kept institutional secrets and, second, 
 
2  ECJ, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, [1963] ECR 1, 23 and Case 
6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 1141, 1158-1159. 
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to make the most out of it theoretically.3 That secret is the pluralistic and deterritorialized 
nature of democracy and generally of politics in Europe. Whether post-national4 or natio-
nal, many democratic theories suffer nowadays from a territorial bias that prevents them 
from accounting properly for the new democratic reality in Europe. True, most theories 
have realized the necessity of post-national democracy in a world where national processes 
no longer issue the norms that apply to them. However, although they have acknow-
ledged the tyranny of national paradigms of democracy and hence developed new models 
of post-national democracy, the relevant democratic polity and hence the relevant de-
mocratic subjects in most cosmopolitan democratic theories remain territorial ones 
whether national or supranational. The problem is that the territorial boundaries of de-
mocracy exclude many non-national citizens’ interests, which are affected by domestic 
decisions, and therefore conflict more and more with political equality and with the inclu-
sive nature of democracy. This is the case of most accounts of democracy in the European 
Union which focus on the co-operation of territorially delineated national demoi or on the 
constitution of a pan-European demos which encompasses all the national demoi and hence 
simply overterritorializes national democratic boundaries (see Thompson 1999).  
 It has become crucial therefore to examine the institutionalization of European demoi-
cracy more closely.5 Scope precludes, however, focusing both on theorizing an institution-
sensitive model of European democracy and further institutionalizing this model. The 
present paper will as a result concentrate on the former only, leaving the latter to future 
research (see Besson 2006a and 2007b). After a discussion of the contours of post-national 
democracy in general, the paper will identify and discuss the answers one should give to 
 
3  From a methodological perspective, the paper purports, starting from the evidence of deterritoriali-
zation of democracy in Europe, to discuss its theoretical underpinnings, then suggesting in return 
ways in which the institutionalization of European democracy may develop this deliberative poten-
tial. A combination between a “top-down” and a “bottom-up” approach is required that allows for a 
certain influence of the post-national political and legal reality on normative considerations (Gut-
mann and Thompson 2004, 37), while also in turn constraining that institutional reality with those 
very normative considerations. All this explains how the EU can be used as an example against 
which one should test institutional considerations of post-national democratic theory, without, ho-
wever, necessarily being taken as an absolute model and an optimal outcome, given the constant 
need for institutional reform (Nicolaïdis and Lacroix 2003, 137; Besson 2006a). On these methodo-
logical issues, see Besson 2007b. 
4  I refer to the term ‘post-national’ as a generic term to mean non-strictly national, whether suprana-
tional or merely international. It should not be taken to mean that post-national law supplants and 
replaces national law; it can well coexist with it. 
5  The term ‘institutions’ is used here in a broad sense to refer to all official bodies in charge of law-
making in a globalized legal order, whether at the international, supranational, transnational or na-
tional level. They include states as much as international organizations, and these bodies as much as 
their own (sub-)institutions (e.g. the EU and its institutions). 
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the three keyquestions raised by the theorization of democracy in Europe: whose democra-
cy, where and how. 
1. Post-national democracy in general 
Democracy requires that all those whose basic interests are (normatively) affected by policy 
decisions are able to participate in the process of making them or at least have an influence 
on that process. Global6 democracy draws the consequences of globalization for democra-
cy. Similarly European democracy is a consequence of the Europeanization of law-making 
for democracy. National states are no longer the only sources of decisions that affect their 
legal subjects (Habermas 2001); many decisions are taken outside the reach of national 
political processes by European law-making processes, but also by other national political 
processes which themselves produce decisions that affect people outside their electoral 
constituencies. Europeanization thus generates a legitimacy gap that needs to be filled by 
Europeanizing democracy and extending it beyond the national state (see Archibugi 2004, 
438 in the global context).  
 Post-national democracy groups all democratic processes that occur beyond the national 
state or within the national state, but in ways that link national democracy to other trans-
national, international or supranational democratic processes. It is not simply, on the one 
hand, about improving national processes, nor about legitimizing post-national processes 
indirectly through those national processes (Archibugi 2004, 442). Nor should it, howe-
ver, be confused, on the other hand, with the idea of a cosmopolitan state and supranatio-
nal democracy (see e.g. Held 1999; Habermas 2001). It does not prejudge the nature of 
the post-national polities whose regime should be democratized (Beitz 1994; Gosepath 
2002; Besson 2006a). In fact, the idea of a world state has long been regarded as neither 
feasible nor desirable given the resilience of the national state and its key role in the global 
law-making processes (Archibugi 1993, 306). The same may (still) be said about the pro-
ject of a European federal state. 
 Rather, post-national democracy follows a pluralist pattern: it does so both quantitati-
vely in identifying different levels of legitimation and qualitatively in placing national 
democracy at the core of global democratic processes albeit in making it more inclusive 
 
6  In what follows, the term ‘global’ has been chosen to include all institutions and processes implica-
ted in the production of global law, whether supranational, international or transnational, but also 
national institutions and processes which remain at the core of the former either for implementation 
or further legislative purposes. Global institutional design should not therefore be conflated with a 
brand of institutional cosmopolitanism. Nor should global law be identifed only with international 
law; the production of legal norms in a globalized world may no longer be clearly attributed in 
terms of their sources to one law-making forum in particular.  
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(see Sassen 2003). Even though they have been deeply affected and somehow weakened by 
globalization, national law-making processes remain much more central to global law-
making processes than some claim they are (see e.g. Kumm 2004, 915-916). They remain 
crucial, for instance, to the ratification and implementation of international norms (Paulus 
2004; Sassen 2003, 10 and 15). They have also become major channels of transnational 
and comparative law-making (see e.g. Slaughter 2000 and 2004; Delbrück 2003). In re-
vealing the beneficial connections between national democracy and transnational, interna-
tional or supranational democracy, post-national democracy proposes the implementation 
of a multi-layered and multi-centred democratic polity within, among and beyond states.  
 Of course, if one transforms democracy within, among and beyond states, it is impor-
tant to adapt it to the new post-national constellation and its many layers of governance. 
Post-national polities cannot be governed in the same way as national ones. Moreover, 
democratic models also need to be revised at the national level, since, on the one hand, 
national democracies can be deemed deficient in many ways in a globalized environment 
(see e.g. Mény 2003; Archibugi 2004; Schmidt 2004, 976; Guéhenno 1992). On the 
other hand, post-national democracy is a global process that integrates all layers in such a 
way that their democratic quality can no longer be judged in an isolated fashion and de-
pends on their imbrication with other layers (Dryzek 1999; Archibugi 2004). In short, the 
model of European democracy proposed needs to take into account the existing post-
national institutional reality in Europe and reassess democratic normative requirements 
developed in the state context in this new light.  
2 Deterritorialized and deliberative demoi-cracy in Europe 
There are three main characteristics that a theoretical model of European democracy 
should have in order to be able both to accommodate and further constrain institutional 
developments in Europe: first, European democracy should be understood as comprised of 
a multitude of democratic subjects, hence the concept of demoi-cracy (the answer to the 
‘whose democracy’ question); second, European democracy should not only be denationali-
zed but also deterritorialized (the answer to the ‘where’ question); and, finally, European 
democracy should become more deliberative, hence the concept of deliberative demoi-cracy 
(the answer to the ‘how’ question). 
a European demoi-cracy 
i The existence of the European democratic polity 
The absence of a European demos has always been one of the main objections to European 
democracy (Urbinati 2003). It is also referred to as the no-demos thesis. It is crucial therefore 
to start by addressing this objection and identifying the relevant democratic subjects in the 
EU.  
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 The problem is that there is no agreed set of criteria as to how to judge what makes a 
multitude of people and an ‘overlapping community of fate’ a political community, i.e. a 
demos. Self-rule and self-legislation which lie at the core of democracy also imply self-
constitution; the community which binds itself by the laws it generates also defines itself 
at the same time as a democratic subject by drawing its own boundaries (Benhabib 2004, 
Ch. 4). All it takes therefore is some kind of ‘we-feeling’, a form of solidarity among diffe-
rent ‘stakeholders’ (Archibugi 2004). It is, in other words, a largely contingent question 
that often depends on historical events and developmental trends (see e.g. Canovan 1996; 
Miller 2000), but may also take place as part of an institutional establishment. In fact, 
solidarity need not necessarily be pre-political at all; certain national polities in Europe 
have only become such through their constitutionalization process.  
 This minimal requirement of a solidarity feeling can also apply at the post-national 
level, therefore; it can be generated by the political exercise of self-constitution of post-
national institutions (Calhoun 2003). This explains why the European Union may be dee-
med as a democratic polity (see Besson 2006a and 2006b). 
ii The constituency of the European democratic polity 
The next question to arise is that of the European democracy’s constituency. Among the 
different potential subjects, it is important to distinguish between the national demoi which 
subsist as a basic layer of European democracy and the European demos that is, depending 
on the conceptions, either independent or imbricated in national demoi, thus raising diffi-
cult issues pertaining to the nature of that imbrication.  
 The national demoi are clearly some of the basic subjects of European democracy; they 
retain sovereign competences in many areas of European law-making. They are also the 
indirect source of the democratic legitimacy of all intergovernmental decision-making at 
the European level. It would be a mistake, however, to draw a clear distinction between 
the national demoi and the European demos. The European demos is plural in nature and 
hence cannot be detached from each single national demos. These national demoi are more 
together than the mere sum of many distinct democracies with their different national 
demoi, because all of them are distinctly European. Thus, even national law-making proces-
ses implicate all national demoi affected when they address European matters. This explains 
why the EU is often regarded as a Union of both states and peoples. Europe is not only a 
union of states in which demoi are connected indirectly through their leaders, but also a 
union of peoples in which these demoi are connected directly. This is exemplified by the 
fact that EU citizenship is dependent on national citizenship. One can only be a European 
citizen by also being a national citizen, but more importantly one can no longer be a nati-
onal citizen without also being a European citizen. 
 If the European demos is more than the mere sum of national demoi, the question remains 
as to its exact identity. There may indeed be one or many subjects of European democracy, 
depending on whether there is a distinct and overarching European demos or, on the 
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contrary, a demos constituted of many European demoi in which the national demoi linked by 
European constitutional principles and values are imbricated.  
 According to some authors, there cannot be a European democracy without a single 
European demos. These authors group pure intergovernmentalists, who are sceptical of the 
European political construction, but also supranationalists, who believe in a European 
super-state. What they have in common is the statist model of post-national democracy, 
according to which there can only be one overarching demos in a democracy. Those who 
reject the statist model of the European polity do not look for a single demos in Europe. 
They acknowledge the existence of a complex European demos, but emphasize the plurality 
of European demoi constituting it. Rather than having a single subject, European democra-
cy would have a plurality of subjects or demoi at its core (see Archibugi 2004; Bohman 
2005). The latter can therefore retain their entire sovereignty and political diversity. 
 European democracy is a whole that cannot simply be assessed either from a purely 
national or a purely European standpoint. To quote Nicolaïdis, European democracy is 
neither a ‘Union of democracies’ nor a ‘Union as democracy’, but a ‘Union as demoi-cracy’ 
(Nicolaïdis 2003, 5; see also Besson 2006a and 2007b; Bohman 2004 and 2005; Nico-
laïdis 2003 and 2004; Poiares Maduro 2002; Weiler 1999; Van Parijs 1998). European 
citizenship is not to be viewed as membership in an overarching demos, but as an additional 
European membership that is necessarily imbricated into every single national demos and 
turns each of them into a European demos (see Besson 2006a). This is, one may argue, the 
true meaning of being European, i.e. being united in diversity rather than being diverse in 
unity (Magnette 2006). 
b European deterritorialized demoi-cracy 
i The principle of deterritorialized demoi-cracy 
Not only should European democracy be understood as a process connecting a plurality of 
democratic subjects, but it can only be effectively understood as such if it is conceived of as 
deterritorialized and as constituted of a European functional demos of demoi. Plurality is not 
only a quantitative characteristic of European democracy, but also a qualitative one qua 
functioning mode in each of these many subjects of European democracy wherever they 
are localized. According to Nicolaïdis, demoi-cracy in the European Union ‘requires infor-
med curiosity about the political lives of our neighbours and mechanisms for our voices to 
be heard in each others’ forums’ (Nicolaïdis 2003, 5). 
 On this model, different national demoi, either located separately at national level or 
together in different fora at the transnational, international or supranational European 
levels, constitute together a European functional and deterritorialized demos. For instance, 
national citizens elect and vote in national elections as European citizens, thus including 
other national interests in Europe and turning national polities into European ones. Simi-
larly, in European institutions, national representatives deliberate neither as representati-
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ves of their national demos only nor as those of a single European demos, but as representati-
ves of a functional demos of demoi by factoring in other national interests in Europe.  
 Only so, can our democratic practices accommodate the rapidly increasing deterritoria-
lization of law, which belies the basic democratic principle of inclusion of all those affected 
by democratic decisions. The progressive deterritorialization of politics (Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt and Perraton 1999, 32; Held, 1995, 237) and law-making processes leads in-
deed to the erosion of the congruence between those affected by a law, i.e. the legal 
subjects, and the authors of this law. This growing gap violates the principle of political 
equality and of democratic inclusion (Dryzek 2001, 651, 662; Archibugi 2004, 439; Held 
1995 and 2004). More precisely, there is a twofold deficit in territorial democracies: first, 
national citizens do not control many decision-making processes which impact on national 
polities, but take place outside their borders; and, second, national polities exclude from 
participation and representation many interests which are affected by their decisions.  
 The deterritorialization of law should therefore be matched by the progressive deterrito-
rialization of democratic processes themselves (see e.g. Besson 2006a; Bohman 2005; Ar-
chibugi 2004, 445; Dryzek 1999, 44). If legal pluralism implies the possibility for legal 
norms of different origins to apply to the same person in the same place, there should also 
be a pluralism in legitimation; it is important indeed that this person can participate in the 
different law-making processes at the origin of these norms wherever they are located and 
this in turn implies including other affected demoi in each demos’ deliberations, whether 
these take place at a national, international, supranational or transnational level. In other 
words, functional mechanisms of legitimation should be developed to match growing legal 
functionality and its gradual replacement of legal territoriality (see Teubner and Fischer-
Lescano 2006; and an early comment by Paulus 2004). 
 True, the idea of deterritorialization raises the well-known paradox of the democratic 
polity, according to which the modern democratic polity is both constituted and constrai-
ned by contingent territorial boundaries and hence cannot by definition be as inclusive as 
it should (see e.g. Benhabib 2004, Ch. 4; Poiares Maduro 2002; Whelan 1983; Offe 
1998). Territoriality is no fatality, however, and democratic iterations may gradually help 
fill the gap between those affected and those participating (see Besson 2006a). Thus, in 
understanding European democratic polities as closed territorial entities (see e.g. Pogge 
1997; Habermas 2001 in the EU; and, to a certain extent, Held 1995, 154, 236), many 
theories ignore one of the most important components of European demoi-cracy: the func-
tional imbrication of polities and the impossibility of assessing the democratic quality of 
one and every single polity in isolation of others’ (Bohman 2005; Besson 2006a).  
ii The fora of deterritorialized demoi-cracy 
What is specific about European demoi-cracy is that it takes place at the same time at ma-
ny different levels of territorial governance: national, international, supranational and 
transnational (Sassen 2003; Held 1999). These different layers constitute a network of nati-
onal, transnational and international agencies and bodies that match, cut across or group 
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spatially delimited locales (Held 1995, 237; Dryzek 1999). In fact, demoi-cracy is not only 
about being multi-layered and somehow overterritorialized (see Thompson 1999; Besson 
2006a), but also multi-centred and imbricated at all levels; it is not only about taking 
decisions at different places and multiplying deliberative fora, but also and mostly about 
taking them together in a deterritorialized fashion in those same places (see Schmidt 2004; 
Nicolaïdis 2003, 6). In this sense, post-national demoi-cracy does not subvert national and 
other international or supranational sovereignties (see e.g. McGrew 2000), but on the 
contrary opens them to each other in each and every single locale.  
 Multiplying transnational or international decision-making authorities to further trans-
national deliberation may be necessary, but it also tends to undermine democratic accoun-
tability within national democratic processes themselves (see Gutmann/Thompson 2004, 
62). As a result, and by reaction to a fear of disempowerment, national democracies tend 
often to become paradoxically the primary hindrance to the development of European 
democracy, both within national fora and beyond them (see Archibugi 1993, 313-314). 
This is deeply counterproductive given the pivotal role national processes still play in the 
implementation of European law and hence should have in their legitimation process; the 
national forum is the place where the plurality of legal norms applicable to an individual in 
a globalized world converge and hence the place where they can be made coherent norma-
tively (on legal pluralism and normative coherence, see Besson 2004a; Besson 2007a). 
Moreover, the proximity of national institutions to individuals makes them a primary fo-
rum of direct legitimation in the European law-making process. It is thus central to start 
by enhancing the representation of foreign interests in national deliberations and thus by 
turning national democracy into a central forum of European democracy, before working 
on the inclusive quality of further law-making fora at EU level.  
 According to the proposed model, European non-national citizens of a national demos 
should be included in the deliberations of that demos in those domains in which they consti-
tute with other non-national European citizens a further functional European demos. One 
may distinguish two phases in the progressive deterritorialization of national democratic 
processes in the EU: first, the inclusion of European non-national citizens in municipal and 
European elections in the territorially bounded demos and, second, the mutual internaliza-
tion of other European interests in national deliberations even when those European citi-
zens do not reside in the given Member State. The first step has already largely taken place 
thanks to EU citizenship rights, while the second is still to be made (see Poiares Maduro 
2002 and 2003). If there is a right to choose one’s polity independently of nationality in 
the EU, this leads to what I have called elsewhere ‘democratic forum-shopping’ in Europe 
(see Besson 2006a; Poiares Maduro 2002 and 2003). In turn, this forum-shopping and the 
denationalization of citizenship in Europe it implies will gradually lead to the latter’s de-
territorialization and the internalization of non-territorial interests (see Besson/Utzinger 
2007). Addditionally, one may expect that national deliberations might gradually interna-
lize the interests of those non-EU citizens affected by them, just as they internalize the 
interests of EU citizens who are nationals of other Member States and this whether these 
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third country nationals reside in the Member State in question – and hence benefit from 
quasi-EU citizenship rights7 – or not (Nicolaïdis and Lacroix, 2003, 127 and 136).  
 If one extends democratic deliberation across territorial polities functionally to all those 
significantly affected by a decision, one may count with a new kind of political consti-
tuents or subjects, i.e. moral-political constituents, besides electoral or formal-political 
constituents (see Gutmann/Thompson 2004, 37-38; Thompson 1999, 120). It is impor-
tant to distinguish the subject of democracy, the European functional demos of demoi, from 
the territorial entities in which the national demoi are located. The functional link between 
the different territorial national demoi is indeed a political one albeit not necessarily an 
electoral one, and not only a moral one (e.g. Cheneval 2006; contra: Besson 2006a). If the 
functional demos of demoi is constituted on grounds of deterritorialized solidarity, however, 
one needs to determine what makes it the case that someone is a citizen of a functional 
demos rather than of another. Most authors mention the fact of being ‘affected’ by a polity’s 
decision as sufficient (see e.g. Gould 2004; Gutmann/Thompson 2004). Stakeholders in 
these overlapping communities of fate are not, however, always strictly speaking bound by 
the democratic decisions taken by other polities. They are at most strongly affected by 
them and this is a purely factual criterion which anyone can fill and which does not there-
fore suffice to trigger normative consequences and democratic rights in particular. In prac-
tice, however, the difference is often moot, since stakeholders simply have to abide by the 
new factual or legal situation thus created. As such, their being ‘affected’ is already, albeit 
indirectly, normative and not only factual.  
 Of course, the line must be drawn somewhere (Thompson 1999, 120). The first crite-
rion must be one of degree of affectation of the interests which must be comparable to a de 
facto obligation. Thus, for instance, what makes the national demoi in Europe part of a 
functional European demos is the fact that they mutually influence each other’s normative 
orders not only through the primacy of European law stricto sensu, but also indirectly 
through their respective national laws and the latter’s future impact on European law 
(Besson 2004a and 2006); for instance, a national legal principle like privacy or proportio-
nality may gradually become a European principle and hence affect all other national legal 
orders in Europe. Another criterion besides the quasi-normative character of the affected-
ness is that the interests affected must be basic or fundamental interests of the individual, 
i.e. interests in the conditions for self-development or self-determination. 
 
7  See e.g. the recent extension of previously exclusive political rights to third country nationals resi-
ding in EU Member States: C-300/04, M.G. Eman, O.B. Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en 
westerns van den Haag, 12 September 2006, unpublished; and T-49/04, Hassan v. Council and 
Commission, 12 July 2006, unpublished. 
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iii  The objection to deterritorialized demoi-cracy 
A common objection to the deterritorialization of democracy lies in national sovereignty 
and more precisely the concept of popular sovereignty (see Goldsmith and Posner 2005). 
Neither the idea of national sovereignty, residing at least in part in the national parlia-
ment, nor that of popular sovereignty tout court are easily compatible with the idea of de-
territorialized democracy. It seems prima facie counterintuitive indeed to argue that a poli-
ty’s democratic process should be concerned with the interests of another’s and vice-versa.  
This objection relies on an outdated conception of sovereignty, however (see Buchanan 
2006 and 2008; Falk and Strauss 2000, 209). Contemporary state sovereignty can no 
longer be equated only with a sovereignty of competence or immunity. It has also become 
a sovereignty of responsibility towards one’s state’s population, but also towards others’ 
whose interests it might affect. Sovereignty is after all a normative concept which encom-
passes one or many values such as democracy and human rights and this explains the idea 
of sovereignty qua responsibility (Besson 2004b and 2007a). In those conditions, sove-
reignty can only be exercised in coordination, whether this takes place at the national, 
international, supranational or transnational level. This presupposes, in other words, a 
cooperative understanding of sovereignty (Besson 2004b and 2007a; Magnette 2000, 161-
166). As a result, purely territorial sovereignty has gradually been replaced by a differen-
tiated and overlapping functional form of sovereignty (Walker 2003, 22-23). On this ac-
count, the exercize of sovereignty becomes reflexive and dynamic as it implies a search for 
the best allocation of power in each case, thus putting into question and potentially 
improving others’ exercise of sovereignty as well as one’s own.  
 Since democratic rule is one of the values protected by popular sovereignty, the correct 
exercise of sovereignty implies, on the one hand, looking for the best level of decision to 
endow those affected by that decision with the strongest voice and hearing (see Poiares 
Maduro 2002). And this in turn may imply deterritorializing democracy to match the 
deterritorialization of law-making. Often, this will imply giving priority to the level of 
governance closer to those affected, but not necessarily as EU decision-making has de-
monstrated (Besson 2004b). More importantly, functional sovereignty also leads, on the 
other hand, to a change in the nature of the democratic process itself and in the scope of 
those included, whether at national, transnational, international or supranational level; 
this is particularly relevant at national level where all affected interests cannot always par-
ticipate or even be represented. This functional inclusion is not only democratically benefi-
cial to the non-national interests included, but also to the pre-existing national interests. 
Thus, minorities who were previously unheard or social groups whose inclusion was not 
sufficiently guaranteed in certain EU Member States have been empowered by the broader 
inclusion of all European interests affected in national decision-making processes (Besson 
2006a; Dryzek 2005; Schmidt 2004, 980-981). This has contributed greatly to enhancing 
the inclusiveness and accountability of national democratic processes in EU Member Sta-
tes. When viewed in this new light, popular sovereignty is reinforced rather than under-
mined by the deterritorialization of the democratic process. 
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c European deliberative demoi-cracy 
i The principle of deliberative demoi-cracy 
Extending the idea of a plural community of stakeholders beyond territorial boundaries 
has recently been made much easier by deliberative democracy theories. According to the-
se theories, the essence of democracy is not to be found only in voting, but also in delibera-
tion (Besson 2003 and 2006; Gutmann/Thompson 2004; Dryzek 2005).  
 Deliberation matches the plural and deterritorialized nature of European democracy in 
many ways. First of all, deliberation can cope with fluid boundaries and allows for transna-
tional communication (see e.g. Thompson 1999; Gutmann/Thompson 2004; Besson 
2006a). What matters for deliberative democracy is indeed the character of political inte-
raction, rather than its locus. As such, deliberative democracy broadens the scope of de-
mocratic accountability beyond national borders. This is the true meaning of European 
demoi-cracy, i.e. democratic deliberation across different territorial demoi with citizens of 
these different demoi deliberating with each other, thus constituting one demos along diffe-
rent functional lines in each case (see e.g. Bohman 2005; Cheneval 2006; Besson 2006a).  
 Another benefit of the deliberative model of European democracy lies in its reflexivity. 
Deliberative democracy allows indeed for widespread disagreement and deliberation over 
the legitimacy of the polity and its regime (Gutmann/Thompson 2004). As such, it can 
preserve the diversity of perceptions of the European polity on the part of its many demoi. 
A final and connected reason lies in the dynamic nature of deliberation. It is a long-term 
process in which decisions may constantly be re-opened (Gutmann/Thompson 2004, 6). 
This applies particularly well to the European legal process in which the same decisions are 
taken in iterated fashions by different authorities. 
ii The modalities of deliberative demoi-cracy 
This approach to deliberative demoi-cracy in Europe has been contested, however (Gut-
mann/Thompson 2004, 36 seq.). Among the practical and ethical reasons for limiting 
deliberative democracy to territorially bound democratic polities are, on the one hand, the 
complexity of transnational deliberation and, on the other, the absence of the grounds of 
reciprocity that could underlie the duty of justification in public deliberations.  
 To start with, the practical limitations of transnational deliberation need not, however, 
be higher in Europe than in national settings. As I have already explained, indeed, trans-
national deliberation relies greatly on national democratic processes and the latter’s 
complexity need not be enhanced by transnational participation. As a matter of fact, de-
moi-cratic deliberation is best guaranteed by a combination of participation and represen-
tation (Besson 2005a, Ch. 10 and 2005b) and the latter is easier to secure in a complex 
multi-layered and multilateral polity. Democratic representation may even be seen as an 
enhancer of democratic participation and deliberation thanks to the distance it creates 
between deliberation and decision-making and to the relationship of election and accoun-
tability between representatives and their constituencies. Not only can representation en-
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hance democratic participation, but it can also increase the protection of political equality; 
it takes a stronger majority in a representative system to impose a decision on a minority 
due to the many layers and length of the process. This applies not only among citizens and 
European non-national citizens who are equally affected, but indirectly also among citizens 
themselves. In fact, the European experience shows how the interests of national citizens 
may be beneficially protected and the equality among them may be re-established through 
the consideration of non-national EU citizens’ interests (see Schmidt 2002 and 2004; Bes-
son 2006a). Although the representation of non-national citizens’ interests cannot be as 
inclusive as the direct participation of all of them, this incomplete inclusion is compensa-
ted by the correctives representation provides to the excesses of majoritarianism.  
 As to the ethical grounds for limiting deliberative democracy to territorial entities, it 
finds its limitations in those decisions which affect and constrain significantly and hence 
bind, albeit de facto, people in other polities as much as citizens themselves. This mutual 
influence, whether normative or quasi-normative, of national decisions on European non-
national citizens, and vice-versa, as might be the case in the context of environmental or 
health issues, provides the very ground for reciprocity in deliberation and justification. 
Moreover, there is a form of representation that has been developed for diverse and divided 
societies where not all citizens can be represented descriptively and which might contribu-
te to the representation of non-national citizens’ interests in deliberation: reflective repre-
sentation. This institution may help represent moral-political constituents despite their 
electoral absence and conceive of demoi-cratic deliberation in the EU. Reflective representa-
tion requires from each representative that she projects herself into the place of others in 
her own internal deliberation, rather than leave the confrontation with diversity to exter-
nal and interactive deliberation. It corresponds to Kant’s idea of ‘enlarged mentality’ and 
to Arendt’s idea of ‘representative thinking’ (Arendt 1970 and 2001). 
 There are two ways of ensuring a more effective representation of non-national citizens’ 
interests through reflective representation despite the lack of deliberative presence. First of 
all, diverse representation. Without some kind of minimal descriptive representation, reflecti-
ve representation cannot be as diversified as required by the representation of non-national 
citizens. It is necessary to give representatives the incentive to make other perspectives 
imaginatively present. Ideally, therefore, it is a mixture of both the descriptive and reflec-
tive forms of representation which should be used to represent the views of non-national 
citizens affected by national decisions (Eckersley 2000; Goodin 2003, 171). Although 
minimal descriptive deliberation is required, it is very unlikely that moral-political consti-
tuents will be represented as fairly as electoral constituents in national deliberations. In 
Europe, the solution lies in granting to European albeit non-national citizens municipal 
and European electoral rights at national level. The problem of representation in national 
authorities remains the same, however. Nevertheless, it might actually be better for the 
quality of deliberations not to have a full descriptive representation of all non-national 
citizens as people tend to cut deals in such circumstances (Goodin 2003). If, on the contra-
ry, representatives realize the existence of moral-political constituents who are not citizens 
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through their minimal descriptive representation, but also understand at the same time 
that not all perspectives in conflict are represented, they might be more inclined to be 
cautious and respectful of others’ interests (see Sunstein 2002).  
 Secondly, the reciprocity of affected interests in European national polities might actual-
ly also trigger an electoral sanction against those representatives who do not include non-
territorial affected interests in their deliberation and votes. The success of democratic ac-
countability greatly depends on the moral capacities of citizens and public officials. As 
such, the support of elected representatives by their electoral constituents will in principle 
follow their championing the cause of moral-political constituents (Gutmann/Thompson 
2004, 39). Besides sanctioning the moral capacities of their representatives, national citi-
zens might also want to make sure, through (re-)electing representatives who represent all 
those affected’s interests, that their own direct interests are well protected. More and mo-
re, this might only be the case when non-national interests are also taken into account in 
the decision-making process. Representatives who do not include all affected interests fail 
to contribute the way they should to the delegated exercize of cooperative sovereignty and 
hence to the mutual inclusion of interests in their respective democratic fora. Such failure 
might in turn trigger electoral sanctions at national level for those representatives who do 
not play by the rules, as this omission might result in reverse effects on the inclusion of 
national interests elsewhere. In Europe, the development of this electoral sanction will 
match the process of gradual internalization of other Europeans’ interests in national deci-
sions and the competition between national democratic processes alluded to before. 
iii  The objection to deliberative demoi-cracy 
Of course, any demos whether territorial or functional cannot be conceived of as entirely 
independent from existing political institutions be they national, transnational, internatio-
nal or supranational. In some institutional contexts, sharing common institutions has even 
given birth to a demos. To think that democratic deliberation could be independent from 
institutions would therefore be equal to thinking that the demos could ever be independent 
from history (Archibugi 2004).  
 Institutions no longer depend only on territorial boundaries, however; many are 
established to fulfill certain cross-border functions and this is the case of many transnatio-
nal bodies. After all, it is history that made territorial boundaries the relevant boundaries 
of modern democracy. Ancient democracy and citizenship did not depend on nationality 
and territory and there is no reason why migration and globalization might not put this 
linkage into question (Preuss 1995; Benhabib 2004). It is deliberative democracy itself 
that will help to mend retrospectively the democratic deficits in its constitution and insti-
tutional boundaries. Political equality commands inclusion and respect for all affected 
interests, and political constituents need not be restricted to electoral ones.  
 Defining the identity of a democratic people is an ongoing process of constitutional self-
creation. While we can never eliminate the paradox of the democratic polity, according to 
which those who are excluded will not always be among those who decide (see e.g. Benha-
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bib 2004, Ch. 4; Whelan 1983; Offe 1998), we can and should render these distinctions 
fluid and dynamic through processes of continuous and multiple democratic iterations and 
new institutional arrangements (see Buchanan 2004, 324; Benhabib 2004; Delbrück 
2003, 40).  
Conclusion 
The question of democratic legitimacy in Europe has attracted a lot of attention since the 
French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. By concentrating on the supra-
national or international level of governance in the EU, accounts of European democracy 
propounded in recent years have diverted attention away from the national level. Since the 
latter remains the primary locus not only of national law-making, but also of European 
legal enforcement, it is important not to underestimate its importance in the European 
legitimation process.  
 Reverting entirely to traditional statist conceptions of democracy would be vain, howe-
ver. It is this traditional conception of constitutional democracy that might actually ex-
plain why the constitutionalization of Europe was perceived as a threat by a majority of 
the European population. The legitimacy gap in the European Union will not be filled 
before constitutional pluralism, that has become the European legal order’s trademark, is 
matched by a corresponding model of democratic legitimacy. The paper identified three 
dimensions a more institutional reality-sensitive model of European democracy needs to 
have: first, it should be pluralistic both in the quantity of democratic subjects and in their 
inclusive quality; second, it should not only be denationalized, but also deterritorialized so 
as to include all those affected in each and every single one of the many democratic 
subjects identified; finally, it should be deliberative so as to be as flexible and dynamic as 
possible and match its inherent plurality and deterritorialization.  
 While developing such a theoretical model that reflects the unique post-national insti-
tutional developments in Europe is an important step, overcoming easy rhetoric is even 
more crucial in this period of deep questioning of the European project. Without institu-
tional mechanisms to further the deterritorialization of national, international and supra-
national democratic processes, truly transnational deliberation cannot take place in Euro-
pe. It is high time therefore to give our unique European demoi-cracy real institutional 
teeth. 
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